中國與世界秩序評論

不得已的战略收缩
——美国对中国崛起的回应

本期作者：陆伯彬（Robert S. Ross）

澄海全球發展與安全
高等研究院

主编：杨光斌
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陆伯彬
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阅读提示

在大国竞争的背景下，东亚正在发生一场深刻的权力转移，改变了第二次世界大战以来东亚地区的安全基础。自二战结束以来，美国一直享有东亚海上霸权，其全球战略在冷战后近三十年的单极时刻中达到顶峰。然而，随着中国崛起、东亚地区力量格局发生深刻转型，美国应如何在维持前沿威慑与实施“收缩-重整”之间取得平衡？本研究力图探讨美国当前在东亚地区的战略与政策，通过重新检视战略收缩来探讨当前美国东亚政策对其国家安全的影响。

第一，权力转移会导致地区紧张局势的加剧。崛起大国根据自身利益对现行安全秩序的重构，会导致衰落大国的利益受损，在这个过程中和平变革主导权是困难的。此时，战略收缩作为一种安全政策可以为衰落大国争取资源调配与重新整装的时间空间，然而美国同时面临着激励和抑制战略收缩的因素，加剧其安全政策的紧

张。

第二，中国崛起正在挑战美国介入和影响东亚地区的能力。近年来，中美相对实力的差距不断缩小，而美国在资源调配和生产能力上的限制阻碍其应对中国的挑战。此外，其赖以维持竞争优势的武器技术并不完全可靠，中国也在同步取得电子战、网络战和最新军事技术上的进展，使得美国不再能确保战时获得区域内的空中和海军设施的准入。

第三，中美相对实力的变化挑战美国战略伙伴关系。美国亚太地区部分盟友正在中美权力转移的背景下调整与美国的关系，产生政策不稳定性和其在中美之间的不确定性，削弱了安全伙伴对美国安全的持续贡献。为此，美国正加大在东亚地区的声誉外交，通过彰显存在的行动弥补自身实力的下降。

第四，美国正在经历向印度洋和西太平洋的战略收缩。特朗普和拜登政府任期，美国正在更远离中国的地区寻求新的安全伙伴，通过与澳大

利亚、印度、巴布亚新几内亚、日本、西太平洋岛国的军事合作，建立印太地区的反介入/区域拒止战略。

结论是，美国的印太战略正在寻求向更远地区的战略收缩，以换取重新武装的机会。然而，一系列限制性因素使得其难以放弃东亚地区、聚焦战略收缩。其在东亚彰显存在的行动增加了老旧设备的维持费用，进而影响了重新武装的预算与能力，削弱了战略收缩所带来的机会。

不得已的战略收缩
——美国对中国崛起的回应

陆伯彬

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关键字：战略收缩、权力转移、大国竞争、中国崛起、前沿威慑、印太战略、军事技术竞争

美国正在经历一场权力转移，这动摇了其第二次世界大战后在东亚的安全基础。中美相对实力的变化使中国能够挑战其海上安全和战略伙伴关系，美国不再能确保在战时获得区域内的空中和海军设施的准入。与此同时，美国应对中国崛起的能力也面临着诸多限制。

战略收缩是困难的。为了长期安全，战略收缩需要在短期内降低安全性，削弱与重要安全伙伴的

伙伴关系，并向竞争对手让渡威望。对于美国来说，战略收缩尤其困难。自第二次世界大战结束以来，美国一直享有东亚海上霸权，包括冷战结束后的三十年单极霸权。美国现在抵制权力转移对美国安全和美国国防政策的后果。

美国对战略收缩的抵制体现在其依赖于在南海和台湾海峡的海军和空中开展行动，以维持其决心的声誉，从而向其安全伙伴保证其对防御的承诺。然而，尽管美国试图抵制衰落，但同时它也的确在进行战略收缩。五角大楼的印太战略是一种调整，旨在通过扩大安全伙伴关系并在印度洋和西太平洋获得更多空中和海军设施的使用权，减少美国在东亚的能力。这一战略有助于美国的反介入/区域拒止（A2/AD）能力，从而限制中国海军进入印度洋和西太平洋。

本文第一部分审视了关于权力转移和大国战略收缩的文献及其对美国安全政策分析的贡献。第二部分审视了中国的崛起以及美国在东亚的战争能力的相应下降。第三部分审视了美国安全伙伴关系的衰落，因为次要国家已经根据美国和中国之间力量对比的变化做出了调整。第四部分审视了美国如何通过在南海和台湾海峡的存在行动来抵制战略收

缩。第五部分审视了五角大楼的收缩战略，重点关注印太战略以及美国在印度洋和西太平洋的 A2/AD 能力的发展。最后一部分考虑了抵制战略收缩对海军重建舰队的成本。结论涉及美国政策对美国安全的影响。

一、权力转移和战略收缩

权力转移导致紧张局势加剧、进而引发大国战争的可能性很高。[1] 一方面，这种动态源于崛起大国的安全诉求。崛起大国并未参与现有安全秩序的建立，它寻求与其能力增长相称的政治变革。[2] 另一方面，衰落大国抵制新秩序和安全受损。随着力量分布的持续变化，崛起大国的战略目标扩大以反映其崛起的能力，衰落大国的担忧也随之加剧。[3]

和平变革是困难的。对于衰落大国来说，当崛起大国的未来意图本质上不可知时，与其屈服于更大的不安全，其更倾向于发动一场预防性战争。此外，承认衰落也可能破坏联盟，因为次要大国会重新评估衰落大国履行其防御承诺的能力和决心。[4] 承认衰落也很难，因为权力转移涉及对地位的竞争，而霸权大国享受着占据山顶所带来的地位。[5]

然而，战略收缩可以让一个衰落大国获得时间

和空间来“整理自己的事务”，然后带着更多的资源和能力回归到战略竞争中，从而实现更好的安全。“战略收缩以重新武装”是一种安全政策，旨在最大化大国在权力平衡中的长期竞争力。[6]

但大国战略收缩的案例很少。最突出的案例是英国在 1895 年到 1905 年期间从东北亚和加勒比地区的战略收缩。[7]英国对法国和俄罗斯海军力量在欧洲崛起的担忧导致了 1902 年的英日同盟，英国接受了日本作为其在东北亚的继承国，并依赖日本来制衡该地区的俄罗斯力量。[8]在加勒比地区，英国承认门罗主义，并默许美国修建巴拿马运河，这标志着英国接受了美国在加勒比地区作为主导力量的崛起。[9]

在英国对日本和美国的适应中，权力转移发生在欧洲核心战场的周边地区，因此调整并未挑战其核心安全利益。当英国面临法国和俄罗斯海军的崛起，随后是德国海军力量的增长以及德国在欧洲大陆霸权的前景时，战略收缩也发生了。[10]

美国在东亚海域面临从美国主导的霸权秩序向中美两极秩序的权力转移。[11]研究表明，有许多因素抑制了美国的战略收缩。首先，与 20 世纪初的英国不同，美国在其核心战场——西半球并未面临大国

挑战。此外，它不需要在欧洲进行大规模部署对抗俄罗斯的能力。随着俄乌战争的持续，俄罗斯的军事力量和经济资源持续下降，其常规空中和海军力量仍然依赖苏联时期的武器装备。[12]因此，美国可以专注于东亚与中国竞争，而不会削弱其在西半球或欧洲的安全。

其次，对于霸权国家来说，战略收缩尤其困难。在 20 世纪初的东北亚多极格局中，英国可以与日本合作以遏制俄罗斯在该地区的推进，这使得战略收缩以应对欧洲的权力转移变得更容易。[13]相比之下，冷战后东亚海域的现状一直是美国霸权，而中国与其他东亚主要国家（包括印度、日本和俄罗斯）之间的差距持续性地扩大。没有其他大国可以帮助美国制衡崛起的中国。

第三，霸权地位有其特权，即在国际经济、国际机制和国际秩序规则中无可争议的领导地位。[14]然而随着崛起大国缩小与霸权国家的能力差距，地位竞争会随能力分层的减少而加剧，这激发了民间和军方对衰落和战略收缩的抵制。[15]

另一方面，美国也有进行战略收缩的动机。首先，与英国一样，美国在东亚海域的海上霸权并非战略必需。由于美国在西半球已经享有霸权，东亚

海域的海上霸权是一种战略奢侈品。其次，美国在整个 20 世纪欧洲和东亚周边的目标是阻止其他大国实现霸权，而不是寻求自身的霸权。[16]第三，美国面临着与包括英国在内的早期大国战略收缩时类似的财政限制。[17]这些因素创造了“战略收缩以重新武装”的动机，并使舰队的现代化和扩容成为可能。[18]

在此情形下，激励和抑制战略收缩的因素同时存在，这加剧了美国安全政策的紧张。美国对战略收缩的抵制体现在其积极的、快节奏的当前行动中。但美国军方也认识到其战争能力正在下降，因此从东亚海域向印度洋和西太平洋进行了战略收缩，使其部队能够将中国军队限制在东亚海域。

二、中国海上力量的崛起

到 2020 年，中国海军已经有 350 艘舰艇在役。其目前运营着大约 70 艘进攻型潜艇，并且每年服役近 3 艘潜艇。[19]美国国防部（DoD）估计，到 2030 年，中国海军可能在役 440 艘作战舰艇。[20]中国的舰队也很现代化。美国国防部报告称，2021 年中国海军“主要由具有先进反舰、防空和反潜武器及传感器的多功能平台组成。”[21]其驱逐舰携带现代化的反舰巡航导弹和防空导弹。中国的 055 型导弹驱逐舰

有 112 个导弹发射井，每年服役两艘，到 2023 年初已有 8 艘此类舰艇服役。[22]中国海军还在攻击型核潜艇的发展方面取得了显著进展。[23]中国的 DF-21C 中程常规弹道导弹可以瞄准韩国、日本、菲律宾、新加坡和马来西亚的机场、港口和加油设施，且越来越多的 DF-26 导弹能够瞄准关岛的军事设施。[24]

与此同时，美国海军正在缩小规模。首先，预算限制了为应对中国的造船能力而扩大舰队的资金。2015 年，国会预算办公室确定，如果海军的造船预算是过去三十年预算的平均水平，到 2045 年，现役海军舰队将减少至 237 艘舰艇。2022 年，其报告称，为了实现海军最低的造船目标，即重建舰队至 318 艘舰艇，未来三十年的平均造船预算需要比过去五年的平均水平高出 23%，这是自 20 世纪 80 年代以来最高水平的预算。根据 2018 年国会预算办公室的报告，特朗普政府的 355 艘舰艇所需的预算，将比过去三十年海军造船预算的平均水平高出 80%，比过去六年的平均预算高出约 50%。[25]

这些预算限制并不反映美国的经济或财政问题，而是代表了多个支出优先事项之间对政府资源的竞争，并且政府无法重新分配资金以增加国防支出来充分应对中国的崛起。正如曼库尔·奥尔森所

观察到的，国家的衰落可能不是由于资源不足，而是发达经济体的僵化阻碍了支出的重新分配，以应对不断变化的需求。[26]

联邦政府将其预算的 70%分配给福利项目和联邦债务的利息支付，而五角大楼则获得剩余自由裁量预算的 55%，不包括核武器和海岸警卫队的经费。[27]总的来说，2022 年国防支出占联邦预算的比例是 1989 年预算比例的 60%。[28]然而，国会和白宫不会同意减少社会福利项目资金的立法，而且在不影响基础设施、教育和医疗保健等联邦优先事项的资金的情况下，也几乎没有能力将自由裁量资金重新分配给国防。很明显，国会和白宫无法就增税以增加国防支出达成一致。2023 年，尽管中国宣布其国防预算增加 7.2%，拜登政府也仅提议将美国国防预算增加 3.2%。[29]

美国对国防预算的分配也存在限制。根据官方预算，美国的国防预算远远大于中国的国防预算。2021 年美国的国防支出占国内生产总值的比例是中国的两倍多。[30]但美国国防支出的分配严重倾向于人员、维护和运营。在其 2021 年的预算中，美国海军将其支出的 28%用于采购，这反映了全募兵制军队的高成本，包括工资、住房和福利的费用，以及运

营和维护的成本。[31]总体而言，2021 年的采购仅获得了总国防预算不到 20%的份额。[32]相比之下，中国既没有全募兵制军队的成本，也没有老化的舰队成本。

美国应对中国崛起的第二个限制是其造船业的衰退。即使美国能够大幅增加其造船预算，海军也无法将其舰队规模扩大到与中国造船能力相匹配的程度。中国有数十个能够建造军舰的造船厂，而美国从 1990 年的 8 个造船厂减少到 2023 年的 2 个。2023 年，海军部长指出，中国的一个造船厂“比我们所有造船厂的总和拥有更多的产能”。当国会在 2022 年增加海军的预算请求以资助建造第三艘新型驱逐舰时，海军作战部长迈克尔·M·吉尔达上将回应说，美国没有造船能力来建造额外的驱逐舰，试图将购买量减少到两艘驱逐舰。[33]

美国潜艇舰队尤其受到美国工业基础衰退的挑战。为了让潜艇出海，造船业必须从正在建造的军舰上“拆东墙补西墙”以获取替换部件。2021 年，尽管进攻型潜艇仅占舰队的 17%，但它们却占用了海军总维护预算的 33%。[34]因此，建造延误不可避免，工业界无法支持海军的潜艇建造计划。中国每年可以生产 3 艘潜艇，但 2023 年美国海军报告称其工业基础每年只能交付大约 1.2 艘潜艇。[35]鉴于其工业基

础的缺陷，美国无法期望在海军军备竞赛中与中国竞争。2022 年，中国拥有全球造船业近 50%的份额，而美国所占份额不到 1%。美国海军情报办公室报告称，中国的造船能力是美国的 200 倍。[36]

中美力量对比的趋势使中国能够为东亚海域发展有效的反介入/区域拒止（A2/AD）能力。早在 2016 年，美国水面舰艇就不再期望在东亚海域发动战争。[37]2018 年，菲利普·S·戴维森上将观察到，“中国现在能够在除与美国发生战争外的所有情况下控制南中国海。”[38]但到 2021 年，国防部长劳埃德·J·奥斯汀观察到，美国和中国军事能力之间的总体“差距”已经“显著缩小”。[39]

美国决心保持对中国的军事技术优势这一其与中国军事竞争的核心。[40]然而，技术是与中国竞争的不可靠基础。五角大楼正在开发联合全域指挥与控制（JADC2）系统，但它可能无法弥补舰艇数量的不足。

美国海军军官报告称，东亚的电子战是一个“竞争空间”，但是在某些领域美国“落后于其对手”。美国导弹防御局的一个核心关切就是电子战攻击，[41]因为网络攻击对美国的目标技术构成挑战。乌克兰战争揭示了卫星监视能力在敌方地面通信系统的黑

客攻击面前呈现出脆弱性。[42]2023 年，中央情报局（CIA）确定，中国的网络能力可能使中国能够“夺取”美国卫星的控制权，并“剥夺”和“使”美国卫星对监视和瞄准中国海军平台无效。美国太空发展局报告称，中国对美国地面站的网络攻击“可以摧毁我们所有的卫星”。该机构还担心中国的地面激光系统可能挑战美国的通信系统。五角大楼同样担心中国的激光可能会使美国的卫星失效。它承认，如果国防部的“网络……在空间中容易受到攻击”，那么在太空“我们什么都做不了。”[43]

中国也在追求自己的先进军事技术。它正在开发激光武器、高超音速导弹、舰载电磁轨道炮、广泛的军事无人机和用于军事任务的人工智能。[44]其正在提高水下反潜探测能力，这使得美国潜艇在战时进入并在中国南海行动变得越来越困难。[45]

在许多先进领域，中国的技术水平仍然落后于美国，但中国的科技基础正在改善。在一个相互联系的世界中，全球供应链和网络通信使美国难以限制中国获取先进技术。[46]此外，在许多情况下，中国已经开发出与美国技术具有竞争力的先进军事技术，包括通信技术、人工智能和高速计算。中国也正在开发用于多种军事应用的人工智能，包括反潜

战。[47]

三、美国的安全伙伴与力量平衡的变化

中美权力转移促使韩国和南中国海国家调整与美国的合作，以应对中国的崛起和中国的胁迫。对于韩国和菲律宾来说，这尤其困难，因为它们试图在不损害与美国联盟合作的情况下为中国的利益留出空间。在一系列领导层更迭过程中，两国各自的安全政策经历了重大波动，他们在改善与中国的关系和恢复与美国的合作之间摇摆不定。韩国和菲律宾的政策不稳定性以及它们未来在中美之间的不确定性，削弱了它们对美国安全的持续贡献。与其他东亚国家的坚定政策调整相呼应，美国在东亚的安全伙伴关系的强度显著下降。

（一）菲律宾

在现任总统费迪南德·“邦邦”·马科斯的领导下，菲律宾停止了向中国妥协的趋势。但马科斯的对华政策也只是菲律宾对华政策反复无常的最新一个阶段。这些反复无常揭示了菲律宾在应对力量平衡变化时所面临的困难，该国面临在适应中国利益的同时维持与美国安全合作的压力。菲律宾政策

的这种摇摆不定趋势，为美菲联盟以及美国长期依赖菲律宾对抗中国的能力带来了不确定性。

阿罗约总统（2001—2010）政府搁置了中菲海上争端，并限制了与美国的防务合作。这些政策促成了中菲关系的“黄金时代”。[48]但 2011 年，阿基诺总统改变了政策，在中国声称拥有主权的水域进行能源勘探。2012 年，在美国的鼓励下，菲律宾对常设仲裁法院的中国专属经济区(EEZ)主张提出挑战。同年晚些时候，一艘菲律宾海军舰艇进入黄岩岛环礁湖，意图扣留中国渔船。中国派出监视舰阻止菲律宾舰艇扣留中国船只并离开环礁湖。中国外交部副部长傅莹警告说，中国“已做好充分准备，应对菲律宾方面可能采取的任何升级行动。”[49]中国还限制了菲律宾香蕉对华出口，并减少了中国赴菲旅游。[50]对峙最终以双方舰艇离开该地区而告终，但中国舰艇封锁了环礁湖入口，骚扰菲律宾渔船在争议水域的活动，并维持了对菲律宾的经济制裁。[51]

2016 年，菲律宾总统杜特尔特恢复了阿罗约政府的政策。他同样搁置了海上争端，声称在经济和军事事务上“美国已经输了。”菲律宾国防部长洛伦扎纳表示，为了避免“挑衅性行动”，菲律宾不会参与美国的航行自由行动（FONOPs），并解释说

菲律宾将审查美菲条约，以避免卷入美中冲突。[52]杜特尔特在 2019 年表示：“如果我卷入战争……在几分钟内……我的海军将被碾成粉末……为什么我要挑起争端？”他说，美国缺乏捍卫菲律宾利益的决心。[53]

从马科斯政府开始，菲律宾政府在不同任期内政策的反复无常仍在继续。自 2022 年底以来，菲律宾扩大了与美国的防务合作，并为美国对华国防政策做出了贡献。它允许美国在靠近中国声称拥有主权的水域和面向台湾的菲律宾基地驻军，并与美国海军在中国声称海水域开展合作。但鉴于中国海军的持续增长以及菲律宾领导层和政治的不稳定性，菲律宾政策的长期趋势是不确定的。作为对美菲防务合作扩大的回应，中国海警增加了在菲律宾声称水域的存在，恢复并加强了针对骚扰中国渔船以及菲律宾海军行动的积极反对。[54]

（二）韩国

从本世纪初开始，韩国开始与美国政策保持距离。[55]金大中政府反对乔治·W·布什政府将朝鲜视为“邪恶轴心”一员，并抵制美国对朝鲜核计划的经济胁迫和危机外交。金大中与朝鲜领导人金正日

举行峰会，并促进与朝鲜的经济合作。[56]卢武铉继任金大中后，呼吁韩国成为中美之间的“平衡者”，抵制与美国导弹防御合作，宣称美国不能使用驻韩美军应对朝鲜半岛以外的突发事件，并呼吁结束美国领导下的美韩联合战时作战指挥权（OPCOM）。[57]

随后，李明博总统（2008—2013）期间，韩国政策又重新转向与美国的联盟合作。李明博推迟了 OPCOM 移交韩国的讨论，并允许扩大驻韩美军规模，增加了联合演习的规模。[58]2016 年，朴槿惠总统同意美国导弹防御系统末段高空区域防御（THAAD）系统部署在韩国。THAAD 对韩国防御朝鲜导弹无效，它只能覆盖韩国南部三分之一的领土。但是，通过为 THAAD 系统配备覆盖中国大部分领土的远程 X 波段 AN/TPY-2 雷达系统，而不是覆盖范围较短但足以应对朝鲜导弹威胁的绿松石雷达系统，韩国与美国合作，挑战了中国的陆基二次打击洲际弹道导弹能力。[59]

2016 年，中国抵制韩国与美国的导弹防御合作。首先，中国对韩国实施了代价高昂的经济制裁。[60]其次，类似于对菲律宾的胁迫，中国对韩国专属经济区的侵入次数翻了一番。[61]2015 年，进入韩国声称水

域的中国渔船数量增加了 60%以上。2016 年 6 月，中韩两国渔船发生冲突，韩国政府船只扣押了两艘中国渔船。当年 10 月，一艘韩国海警船在与中国渔船相撞后沉没。[62]

与中国冲突的代价说服了朴槿惠的继任者文在寅，促使韩国重新适应中国的利益。2017 年，文在寅向北京保证，首尔不会允许额外部署 THAAD，现有的 THAAD 系统也不会整合到美国的导弹防御系统中。[63]文在寅重新与美国就 OPCOM 移交韩国事宜进行了接触。他还主张循序渐进地进行无核化谈判，在南北边界建立禁飞区，直接铁路连接穿越非军事区，并援助朝鲜。[64]与金大中的政策类似，这些政策使韩国与中国对朝鲜的政策保持一致。

在文在寅的继任者尹锡悦的领导下，韩国又重新转向更大的联盟合作。尹锡悦扩大了美韩联合军事演习的规模和范围，增加了驻韩美军的军事存在。他还加强了美韩联盟与美日联盟的整合，包括实时共享朝鲜导弹发射情报，这对美国对华导弹防御能力具有影响。[65]他的对朝政策与美国的政策步调一致。但到目前为止，尹锡悦尚未增加在韩国部署 THAAD，并且他成功地抵制了美国反对韩国与中国进行高科技合作——这是韩国的优先事项。[66]尽管如

此，中国还是警告韩国，与美国持续发展防务合作将引发中国更大的反对并导致两国关系的恶化。[67]

（三）马来西亚

2019 年，马来西亚总理马哈蒂尔·本·穆罕默德观察到，“当中国贫穷时，我们害怕中国。当中国富裕时，我们也害怕中国。”然后他补充说，“我认为我们必须找到某种与中国相处的方式。”他解释说，马来西亚必须“接受中国离我们很近的事实”。[68]他还表示，如果中国政府“想要声称南中国海是他们的，那是他们的事情。到目前为止，中国还没有采取任何措施来限制在南中国海上航行的船只，我们对此非常满意。”[69]

马来西亚政府在 2020 年报告说，从 2015 年到 2019 年，中国船只挑战了马来西亚的主权 89 次，但马来西亚仅以秘密外交抗议回应。在此期间，中国和马来西亚举行了多次海军演习，2016 年，马来西亚从中国购买了第一批重要军备。[70]

2020 年，一艘中国钻井船和一艘海警船进入马来西亚专属经济区，以对抗马来西亚的石油钻探。美国派出了三艘军舰到中国船只附近，表面上是为了支持马来西亚的安全。马来西亚外交部长希沙穆

丁·侯赛因警告中国和美国注意局势升级的风险，并鼓励他们合作以维持稳定。[71]

（四）新加坡

2017 年，新加坡与中国就中国和东南亚国家联盟（东盟）之间的首次联合海军演习进行谈判。它已经向中国军舰开放了樟宜海军基地——迄今为止实际上是美国的军港。2019 年，它同意扩大与中国的海军和陆地演习，并为中国海军提供后勤保障。[72]从 2015 年到 2023 年，其海军与中国海军举行了多次演习。[73]

新加坡总理李显龙强调，美国应该适应中国的崛起，他观察到，与美国不同，亚太地区对中国的安全至关重要。他还批评美国“将中国视为对手”。[74]2019 年，李显龙建议“美国非常值得达成一项新的谅解，将中国的愿望纳入当前的规则和规范体系……中国将期望在这种进程中拥有一席之地，因为它认为目前的规则是在过去没有它的参与下制定的。这是一个完全合理的期望。”李显龙进一步建议，“[世界]……必须适应中国更大的作用。各国必须接受中国将继续发展壮大，阻止这种情况的发生既不可能也不明智。”[75]2022 年，李显龙警告美国不

要将中国置于“错误的一方”，将其列为美国抵制俄罗斯入侵乌克兰的“专制国家”之一。[76]

（五）印度尼西亚

尽管印度尼西亚与美国保持着防务合作，但它避免与美国结盟。印度尼西亚已经宣布，它和东盟都不会在美国与中国的关系中选边站。其与中国军队进行军事训练演习，也避免在中国声称的水域进行海军行动。印度尼西亚与马来西亚一道反对美国向澳大利亚转让核技术以联合生产攻击型核潜艇。与中国的政策类似，印度尼西亚对乌克兰战争的起因也采取了中立立场。[77]

（六）日本

在东亚，日本是唯一一个与美国建立了明确防务合作的国家。其对中国的坚定抵制反映了其先进的军事能力和地理位置的孤立性。此外，只有日本拥有不可替代的空中和海军设施、后勤能力和后方支援，这些设施使美国能够在东亚进行前沿部署，并与崛起的中国展开竞争。因此，日本是对美国对其防御承诺最有信心的国家。[78]

四、美国的抵制：东亚的声誉外交

由于美国相对实力以及保卫其盟友的能力有所下降，其安全伙伴也动摇了对美国利益的支持，美国已加大力度向其地区安全伙伴发出信号，表明其决心抵制中国的崛起。当美国拥有海上霸权时，它允许其军事能力“说话”，它会“轻声细语”，声称其卓越的能力向其盟友保证其承诺的可信度。但现在中国已经挑战了美国“大棒”的能力，因此美国大声疾呼，以弥补自身实力的下降。

随着中国的崛起挑战美国的联盟关系，美国在东亚的海军存在有所增加。除了与日本和韩国的频繁演习以及在南中国海的海军演习和过境外，美国还在 2023 年与菲律宾进行了一系列几乎不间断的联合演习。今年 4 月，两国举行了近 40 年来规模最大的军事演习。[79]与菲律宾的这些演习，以及最近在南中国海进行的包括菲律宾、澳大利亚、日本和加拿大海军的联合演习，旨在表明美国联盟承诺的实力。[80]

美国的航行自由行动（FONOPs）也主要是为了表明美国的决心，而不是服务于维护国家在国际水域航行权和维护海上航线安全的利益。南中国海的

这些航线是世界上最重要的贸易路线，但那里的大部分航运是往返于中国港口的，包括来自欧洲、印度和拉丁美洲的航运，以及往返于东南亚国家的航运。[81]美国在南中国海的贸易量很少，其与东亚的大部分航运涉及太平洋沿岸的港口。美国海军有权靠近中国声称的领土和南中国海的人工岛屿航行，但这些行动并非维护其合法特权所必需。在 2022 财政年度，中国的这些声明是多个美国航行自由行动的主题。[82]美国的航行自由行动并不是用来保护安全的海上航行、捍卫中国的贸易的，相反，它专注于战时海上封锁，以阻止中国获得中东能源资源。

美国的航行自由行动有助于美国在南中国海彰显存在，并以此表明其抵制中国崛起的决心。2020 年，美国海军的条令声明“海军的存在……向我们的盟友和伙伴保证我们的承诺”。美国印太司令部前司令戴维森上将在 2021 年表示，美国的行动“让我们的盟友和伙伴放心，我们信守承诺。”[83]戴维森的继任者、印太司令部司令约翰·C·阿基利诺上将在 2022 年解释说，“强大的战区演习计划……表明了我们对合作伙伴的决心。”[84]

在 2019 年和 2020 年特朗普政府执政期间，美国海军舰艇每年在靠近中国人工岛屿的地方进行了

10 次军事演习——比奥巴马政府执政期间的频率高出一倍多——而且美国航母在南中国海的航行从 2019 年的 5 次增加到 2021 年的 10 次。[85]在 2020 年的前五个月，包括 B-52 轰炸机在内的美国飞机在中国水域附近进行了 40 次飞行——是 2019 年同期的三倍多。[86]在就任总统后不久，拜登总统重申了特朗普政府的快节奏存在行动。为了宣传此类行动，2023 年，一架载有 CNN 记者的美国海军飞机飞近了中国宣称的领土。[87]

美国对台政策反映了类似的努力，以表明对中国崛起的抵制。2021 年，中情局和国务院尚未观察到中国攻击台湾的可能性增加。2023 年，美国参谋长联席会议主席马克·A·米利将军确信，中国可能在 2027 年之前不具备入侵台湾的能力，并且他说他没有观察到中国有意使用武力。中情局局长判断中国缺乏实施入侵台湾的能力。[88]

尽管如此，2018 年 7 月，美国海军开始定期频繁地通过台湾海峡。2018 年进行了 3 次过境，2019 年进行了 9 次过境，2020 年进行了 13 次过境。[89]然后，在 2020 年 5 月，中国开始定期进入台湾的防空识别区。美国国防部 2021 年《中国军事与安全发展报告》解释说，这些中国军事活动旨在加强其威慑

姿态，以“表明其对华盛顿和台北关系升温的不满。”[90]即使情报部门在 2023 年进行的威胁评估反映了中国对威慑的关注程度，现在的拜登政府每月也大约进行一次过境，并得出结论认为，中国将继续采取更有力的措施来抵制“感知的对台湾支持的增加。”[91]

五、印太战略：向印度洋和西太平洋的战略收缩

由于美国抵制中国的崛起，其军队正在从东亚战略收缩。在特朗普和拜登政府执政的三年时间里，美国航母没有访问过新加坡的樟宜海军设施；然而，美国在远离中国的印度洋和西太平洋国家寻求新的和扩大的军事设施使用权。[92]前国防部长马克•T•埃斯珀解释说，随着与中国的竞争加剧，美国“必须存在”于印太地区，并“扩大其基地位置，投入更多时间和资源在我们过去没有投入的某些地区。”[93]美国国防部 2021 年《全球态势评估》呼吁改善西太平洋和澳大利亚的军事基础设施。[94]

与远离中国的国家扩大安全合作，使美国能够建立自己的反介入/区域拒止战略。通过进入印度洋和西太平洋的军事设施（靠近东亚的几个海上咽喉

点），美国军方正在发展其将中国海军遏制在东亚水域内的能力。

（一）澳大利亚

从 2008 年到 2018 年，澳大利亚是美国武器的第二大接受国，而且长期以来一直是美国在东亚行动的卫星通信中心。[95]2014 年，美国增加了在澳大利亚北部地区的达尔文空军基地的军事存在，包括轮换部署美国海军陆战队和加强美国的通信设施。澳大利亚同意扩大其利蒙斯和廷德尔基地的机场，为美国在印度洋的行动做出贡献。[96]2021 年，它同意升级四个北部军事基地并接纳美国轮换飞机部署；2023 年，它同意在珀斯建造一个潜艇基地。[97]

2012 年，堪培拉和华盛顿就美国使用位于印度尼西亚以南的科科斯群岛进行无人机监视行动开始讨论。2020 年，澳大利亚资助了该群岛基础设施的升级，用于反潜战行动。[98]

2021 年澳大利亚-英国-美国（即 AUKUS）协议反映了澳大利亚对美国安全的重要性。美国和英国与澳大利亚合作开发澳大利亚核动力攻击潜艇，可能需要 20 年或更长时间才能使第一艘潜艇下海，届时它可能不会为地区安全做出贡献。[99]但是，美国的

安全承诺、给澳大利亚的敏感核技术转让以及国防基础设施和造船业的紧密结合，巩固了其对印太战略至关重要的长期战略关系。[100]

（二）印度

奥巴马政府将印度列为“主要国防伙伴”，允许印度购买军民两用美国设备。印度随后购买了美国的军事侦察直升机，双方建立了五个军事工作组。[101]2008 年至 2016 年间，印度从美国进口的军事物资价值从 10 亿美元飙升至 150 亿美元。[102]美国和印度还签署了一份后勤交换备忘录，使美国能够定期进入印度军事设施，并为美国提供更容易的燃料和后勤支持。[103]

在特朗普政府执政期间，美国和印度缔结了《通信兼容性和安全协议》，该协议改善了敏感军事发展的情报共享。印度还购买了美国的 P-8 反潜飞机。2017 年，印度和美国发起了联合反潜演习，并共享有关中国潜艇行动的情报。[104]2019 年，新德里获得了 22 架阿帕奇进攻型直升机中的前 4 架；2020 年，它同意购买 24 架西科斯基 MH-60R 海鹰多用途反潜直升机；2021 年，它同意购买捕食者无人机。在印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪 2023 年 6 月访问华盛顿期间，

拜登政府同意联合生产军用喷气发动机和弹药技术，并同意向印度出售用于监视行动的先进无人机。美国和印度还同意加强海底领域的态势感知合作。[105] 为了进一步加强两国的伙伴关系，2022 年和 2023 年，美国陆军在靠近有争议的中印边境地区与印度军队进行了演习。2023 年，美国 B-1B 轰炸机飞越了演习区。[106]

印度升级了位于缅甸以西和马六甲海峡的安达曼群岛的作战设施，这些设施有助于美国的反介入/区域拒止能力，以遏制中国海军在南中国海的能力。2020 年，一架美国军用飞机首次在该岛屿上加油。还有报道称，美国和印度官员正在讨论开发海底声响监视系统（SOSUS），以监测中国潜艇从南中国海进入印度洋的情况。[107]

（三）巴布亚新几内亚

2018 年，澳大利亚开始扩建巴布亚新几内亚在马努斯岛上的深水伦布鲁姆海军基地，该基地位于印度洋，菲律宾东南部。2018 年，海军作战部长约翰·理查森上将称赞这一发展是“绝佳的机会”，并表示“我们期待确定我们可以支持的机会。”[108] 美国驻澳大利亚代理大使表示希望这一发展“尽可

能雄心勃勃”。[109]然后，在 2023 年，美国和巴布亚新几内亚谈判达成了一项国防合作协议，巴布亚新几内亚同意美国可以充分和“不受阻碍地”进入伦布鲁姆以及该国的莫尔兹比港海军设施，并允许美国在该设施预先部署军事装备和物资。[110]

（四）日本

美国进入印度洋的设施是建立在长期以来美国在横须贺港（日本）海军存在的基础之上的。由于横须贺位于日本东海岸，琉球群岛之外，因此可以使用部署在东海和西太平洋之间的几个过境点的美国反介入/区域拒止能力进行防御。

2022 年，日本同意增加对美国在琉球群岛之间的咽喉点的行动的后勤支持，这些地点位于东海和西太平洋之间。2023 年，它在该岛屿上部署了反舰导弹，并同意扩大美国海军陆战队在该岛屿的反舰行动。[111]2023 年，海军陆战队滨海战斗团及其海军陆战队远征舰艇拦截系统将有助于战时阻止中国海军通过这些岛屿。[112]日本和美国已经在琉球群岛和太平洋之间的海峡中建立了广泛的声响监视系统网络，加强了他们的反潜反介入/区域拒止能力。[113]

2023 年，美国与菲律宾开启了讨论，以发展美

国在巴丹岛巴斯科的军事存在，该岛屿是菲律宾最北端的岛屿群岛的一部分，位于巴士海峡的南端，巴士海峡是从南中国海到西太平洋的战略通道。美国还在该岛屿上进行了军事演习。长期以来，美国在巴斯科的军事存在将提高美国在琉球群岛的反介入/区域拒止能力。[114]

（五）西太平洋

美国正在西太平洋开发扩大空中和海军设施，以支持“分布式”能力。2021 年《全球态势评估》报告称，美国将在西太平洋开发后勤设施、燃料储存、弹药储存和机场升级设施。空军将增加该地区基地的数量，以支持其以关岛为中心的枢纽-辐条系统。[115]

2019 年，美国军方获得了进入密克罗尼西亚联邦的更多渠道，包括新的海军设施和扩建的机场跑道。2021 年，它与密克罗尼西亚达成协议，在该岛屿上建立军事基地并永久驻扎美军。[116]2020 年，五角大楼完成了翻新工程并开始使用帕劳安格尔机场，并在 2022 年宣布计划开发一个空中和海军防御雷达系统。[117]2020 年，五角大楼还开始升级其在提尼安岛和威克岛的空军设施。2023 年，空军开始从提尼安

岛运营 F-22，作为其枢纽-辐条系统的一部分。[118]

六、战略收缩的代价

即使美国海军正在向印度洋和西太平洋战略收缩，其在东亚水域彰显存在的行动也破坏了战略收缩的潜在好处以及“战略收缩以重新武装”的机会。美国抵制战略收缩的代价是高昂的。尽管美国进行了彰显存在的行动，但东亚的次要大国已经调整了它们的联盟关系，以应对不断变化的中美力量平衡。而为了维持其存在行动，海军运营着一支老化的舰队，在海上花费的时间越来越长，从而导致了运营和维护成本、基础设施发展和战备状态下降。

2023 年期间，美国海军对其潜艇和驱逐舰进行了“寿命延长”，以减缓其老化的舰队的减少，并维持其快节奏的行动。[119]为了保持其舰艇的服役和海上航行时间长于计划的时间，海军推迟了其舰艇的维护。[120]此外，其舰艇等待修理空间的闲置时间延长。当一艘潜艇进行维修时，只有 40%到 50%的所需部件和材料可用。从 2015 年到 2019 年，只有 15%的潜艇维护按计划完成，平均延迟时间为 225 天。2021 年，海军评估称，水面舰队和潜艇的状况已经“恶化”。2023 年，近 40%的美国潜艇停止服役并等待

维修。[121]

在冷战结束时，美国拥有八个造船厂；现在它拥有四个造船厂。在海军增加其使用老旧舰艇开展彰显存在的行动的同时，其计划在 2033 年完成对其四个造船厂的检修，然而，美国政府问责局（GAO）得出结论，海军对检修的预算估计过低。[122]

美国抵制战略收缩影响了战备状态。航空母舰承担着广泛的彰显存在行动的任务，但海军只能满足 50%的需求，只有一半的航母可用于行动。推迟维护的延期部署导致更多的舰艇在海上出现机械问题，并且需要花费更多的时间进行维修。[123]国防部报告称，在战时，中国能够比美国更快地修复受损舰艇并让它们重返海面。美国政府问责局在 2021 年报告说，由于和平时期就已经满负荷运转的不充分的维护设施，海军的战时维修能力将受到影响。[124]

考虑到在长期预算限制下运营老化舰队的成本，美国海军试图“为了投资而剥离”。吉尔代海军上将解释说，退役濒海战斗舰——尽管它还有多年的寿命——是海军的最佳选择：“我拒绝对一个无法追踪当今环境中高端潜艇的系统投入额外的资金。”[125]他同样认为，维持目前的舰队将是一个“把好钱扔进坏水里”的案例，并且削弱美国对中国的

实力优势。相反，为了牺牲其彰显存在行动，吉尔代认为海军必须减少其老化舰队的规模，才能投资于下一代舰艇。海军提出的 2024 年预算要求退役 11 艘舰艇。[126]

早在 2003 年，五角大楼就倡导减少彰显存在行动，以便重建舰队。[127]2010 年，太平洋舰队司令的一份报告发现海军的战备状态存在严重缺陷，反映了在“不惜一切代价都要起航”的文化中降低维护等级。[128]2017 年，海军作战部长写道，改善战备状态需要减少“世界各地的海军存在”，国会需要“接受更高的成本和时间来实现既定的战备标准，这意味着减少海军在全球的存在”。2021 年，前国防部副部长罗伯特·O·沃克写道，军方领导人必须理解，“作战和物资战备状态不应再为前沿存在而牺牲。”[129]

然而，海军遇到了来自平民和军事领导人的抵制。前国防部长阿什顿·卡特抵制了海军减少舰队规模以专注于舰艇建造的努力；他更喜欢维持快节奏的存在行动。[130]国会议员们既专注于维持美国海军的存在，又专注于其选区的就业，一再抵制退役较旧且无效的舰艇。[131]2022 年，众议院军事委员会海权和兵力投送小组委员会首席共和党议员罗布·惠特

曼表示，“缩减海军规模发出了绝对错误的信号……[无论其能力如何]，没有一艘船是一种负担”，并且海军“有全球义务，包括存在[和]保障。”[132]2023 年，参议院军事委员会的资深共和党议员抵制减少海军舰艇，坚持认为海军的计划相当于“结束美国海上指挥权的蓝图”，并且表明其无法应对中国海军构成的威胁。国会 2023 年的海军预算恢复了海军试图退役的九艘舰艇，包括巡洋舰和濒海战斗舰。[133]

战略收缩是困难的，尤其是对美国而言。由于美国无法与另一个大国在区域力量平衡中合作，在需要全球部署的其他战区没有面临重大挑战，并且在一个单极世界中一直独占鳌头，因此它更有可能抵制中国的崛起，而不是进行战略收缩。

然而，战略收缩将允许持续的美国安全以及重新武装。海军有信心它可以从西太平洋和印度洋发展反介入/区域拒止能力，从而将中国海军遏制在东亚水域内。因此，决心抵制中国在东亚内部的存在不仅无效，而且不必要；美国可以通过日益增长的美国海军进入东亚海域周边的海军和空军设施，从而与两极化的东亚地区内的中国海军竞争。

此外，美国抵制战略收缩的代价很高。在东亚水域进行快节奏的海军行动削弱了海军分配稀缺财

政资源以投资于更现代和更有能力的舰队以及发展其造船业和维护设施的能力。因此，抵制战略收缩会通过破坏战备状态和推迟重建舰队以更好地应对中国能力来延长美国海军能力的下降。它还会加剧并延长美国对海军敌对行动的脆弱性。吉尔代上将在 2022 年报告说，即使海军有效地分配其有限的财政资源，也要花费“几十年时间”才能让海军运营“我们最终需要的舰队，以便以我们认为我们想要的方式作战”。[134]

抵制战略收缩也增加了美国实力相对下降期间发生战争的风险。中国受到攻击台湾的威慑，因为潜在的持久战、复杂的两栖登陆作战以及随后对敌对人口的占领需要高昂的代价——美国情报官员和军事领导人都非常清楚这种情况。然而，美国与台湾的扩大安全合作增加了与中国海军发生危机和大国战争的可能性，因为中国越来越担心美国的政策——无论是有意还是无意——都在促进台湾独立。同样，美国频繁接近南中国海中中国声称的海洋地理实体的空中和海军行动，并没有说服当地势力加强与美国的联盟关系——最近菲律宾是例外——反而提高了与中国军队发生意外事件的可能性，从而带来危机升级和战争的风险。

美国抵制战略收缩是权力转移的最新例证。在这种情况下，一个大国反对战略收缩，而倾向于代价高昂且无效的抵抗。文献表明，战略收缩以重新武装，或者放弃以投资，提供了在均势中维持大国能力的最佳方法。战略收缩为美国提供了重建其海军的机会，其运营和维护成本较低，并且能够更好地应对 21 世纪的海军作战。

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2. Organski, *World Politics,* p. 479.

3. Copeland, *The Origins of Major War;* Edel- stein, *Over the Horizon,* chap. 1; Steve Chan, "Exploring Puzzles in Power-Transition Theory:

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4. On declining capabilities and the impact of "prestige" and its respect among its allies, see Gilpin, *War and Change,* pp. 30–34.

5. Andrew Q. Greve and Jack S. Levy, "Power Transitions, Status Dissatisfaction, and War: The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895," *Security Studies* 27, no. 1 (2018), pp. 148–78; William C. Wohlforth, "Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War," *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (January 2009), pp. 28–57.

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